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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
JEANNE ALEXINE JENKIN·S,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

Case No. 8276

JOHN ALLEN JENKINS and
\TERONICA JENKINS,
Defendants arnd Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

This is an appeal from an order granting a "\vrit of
habeas corpus and giving custody of Theodore Scott
Jenkins, age 7, and Mia Jenkins, age 4, to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff is the mother and the defendant John Allen
Jenkins is the father of the two children. \T eronica
Jenkins, the present wife of John, is only a nominal party.
Any further reference to the appellants, unless otherwise
expressly indicated, will be to the defendant John Allen
Jenkins.
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STATE,MENT O·F FA·CTS
The record is silent as to the marital background
of the plaintiff and defendant. This chapter in the lives
of the resp·ective parties involves the question as to what
is for the best interests of their two children presently
within the State of Utah and in the custody of the father.
On May 6, 1954 there was issued a writ of habeas corpus
(Tr. 7) pursuant to plaintiff's complaint ('Tr. 1-6) requiring that the. children be p-roduced before the court to be
dealt with according to law. The complaint pleads an interlocutory judgment of divorce dated March· 9, 19'53 by
the California court awarding the divorce and custody
of the children to plaintiff, except that the defendant has
the right of custody during one calendar month of the
year ('Tr. 4). The final decree under California law was
entered on March 9, 1954 at the instance of defendant confirming the provisions of the interlocutory de-cree (Tr.
6).
By paragraph 5· of the complaint (Tr. 2) plaintiff
alleges:
"That in accordance with the terms of said
interlocutory decree and by reason of the illness
of the plaintiff at the time, the defenwa~t, John
Allen J·enkins, on or about the 5th day of May,
19:53 W'as given cus·tody of sa,id min.or child.ren
by the p·laintiff, it being the intention of the parties at that time that such custody by the defendant, John Allen Jenkins, would be temporary and
that up·on the re-covery of plaintiff from her illness
defendant would return said children to her."
(Emphasis added)
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Defendant by his ans-vver (Tr. 10) alleges that on
~fay 5, 19'53 the children, at the instance and request of
plaintiff, were given to him to care for and have been
cared for by hin1 since said time; that at the time the
children were given in his custody plaintiff was ill, emotionally upset and unable to properly care for the children, and plaintiff has been under the care of doctors
at different periods during the -vvhole of said time; that
there was no agree1nent or understanding between plaintiff and the defendant that the children would be returned
to plaintiff at any particular time or at all. There is
the further allegation by way of answer that at the
present tin1e plaintiff is emotionally unstable and not in
a proper physical or 1nental condition to care for the
children; that it would be for the best interests and welfare of the children that they remain in the custody of
their father, who is a fit and proper person to care for
the children and who has a suitable home for their needs,
protection and care.
The trial court found (Tr. 50) that the plaintiff and
the defendants are equally fit and proper persons to have
the care, custody and control of the children and that the
home of each of them is a proper environment in which
to raise the children. There was no finding as to what
might be to the best interests of the children, except that
it is specifically found (Tr. 50) that the minor child, Theodore Scott Jenkins, is presently enrolled at the Uintah
School (Salt Lake City) in the first grade thereof and
should re1nain in school until such time as the plaintiff
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"is entitled to return to California as provided in the
order of the court to be hereafter made.'' The order referred to ( Tr. 52) provides that the plaintiff shall not
remove the children from the State of Utah until the tilne
specified in the order and not then if the Supreme Court
of the State uf Utah or any Justice thereof orders otherwise. Prior to the time indicated a Justice of this Court
ordered that the children be forthwith placed with and
remain in the custody of the defendant during the determination of this appeal and that neither the plaintiff
nor the defendants shall remove or permit the removal
of the children from the State of Utah during the pendency of this appHal.
The stay thus granted was consistent with counsel's
statement at the trial to the effect that the plaintiff would
not enter into a stipulation of any nature that the children remain here, and that she was employed "do\vn
there" (California) and could not reside ten1porarily
in the State of Utah and keep the boy in school in this
State during the

app~eal

(Tr. 68). Counsel further indi-

cated that he had prepared an order granting plaintiff
the i1nmediate return of the children and allowing her to
take them to California ('Tr. 73). This the trial court
resolved by saying (Tr. 80):
"In other words, if somebody grants a stay,
then she'll either have to stay here and take care
of the children, or else she'll have to let the father
take then1 back out there pending the appeal."
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vVhen the action vvas called for trial in Jlune 1954 the
trial court invited a statement of the parties in the nature
of a pretrial.
"I think I'll require a statement of the theory
of the parties, in the nature of a pretrial, before
we commence, because this may or may not be
able to be settled. I don't mean ultimately settled,
but the matter of why the parties are here rather
than down in the Superior Court of San Diego
County is a very pressing thing to the court. Irregardless of Cook v. Cook and other cases, I'd like
to discuss the lavv before we take any evidence.
I don't mean by that that we can settle the matter,
but we might hurdle something." (T'r. 21)
Pages 21 through 45 of the record on appeal disclose
\vhat is termed by the minute entry of June 22, 1954 (Tr.
16) as "pretrial statements" and "oral stipulation" of
counsel, the minute entry indicating that upon such oral
stipulation and pretrial statements the hearing was continued without date pending the filing by the defendants
vvithin ten days of a petition to modify the decree of divorce in the Superior Court of San Diego County, California, the defendant agreeing to submit himself to such
jurisdiction. The 1ninute entry concludes:
"The Court further retains the temporary
custody of the two minor children, pending an order issuing from the Superior Court of San
Diego, California awarding the custody of the children to either party, at which time this Court will
order the custody of the children in whomever
the Superior Court of San Diego, California directs."
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At the June hearing no inquiry "~as made as to what
might be for the best interests of the children nor were
any witnesses examined. Among the staten1ents in the
nature of pretrial at the June hearing were the follow'Ing:
Plaintiff contends that she has recovered from the
illness alleged in her complaint (Tr. 26) ; plaintiff is a
resident of ·san Fira.ncisco, California (Tr. 28); defendant
was ready to show that on the 5th day of May, 1953, plaintiff suffered an accident, she fell two stories from the roof
of a building, she didn't know what she was doing on the
roof, she doesn't know whether she jump.ed or whether
she fell but, nevertheless, she stayed in the hospital a
number of weeks with a broken back; just prior to that
time she was in a hospital under psychiatric observation,
it being defendant's contention that plaintiff was prematurely released from the hospital; the matters proposed to he shown by defendant have develop·ed since the
C'alifornia interlocutory decree of divorce, were latent
at the time of that decree and never came to the attention
of the California court, and it is defendant's theory that
in this kind of a proceeding those matters can be shown
in the determination of what is to the best interests of
the children (T·r. 34); the defendant is a Lieutenant in the
Navy (Tr. 41), a part time instructor at the University
and lives in S.alt Lake City with his present wife, likewise
the place of residence of the defendant's mother (Tr.
42).
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In the course of the June proceedings, and to adapt
the situation to previous expressions of this Court, considerable was said about preserving the status quo in the
event of an appeal, even though the proceedings were in
the nature of habeas corpus ('Tr. 30-36).
"THE COUR.T: Then to see if I can summarize
this, the parties appear and make a pretrial statement and stipulate the matter may be continued,
the court to retain jurisdiction of the children until such time as an order is obtained by either
party. That is, a new order from the Superior
Court of San Diego. That order could be either
an order denying a petition to modify or granting
a petition. And at that time, upon being advised
of the action of the Superior Court of San Diego
County, this court will then make its written order
directing - or granting the writ if you prevail
down in San Diego, and denying the writ if you
prevail, Mr. Gustin. Is that ·the understanding
now, so that the parties won't have to come back~
~IR.

INGEBRETSEN: And do I understand
there will be no appeal from that~

THE COURT: Oh, down there, I don't knovv
anything about that.
MR.. INGEBRETSEN: I presume that order
will be an appealable orderTHE COURT: Oh, it will be, but you're in effect
agreeing to submit yourselves to California. All
this court is doing is holding the children temporarily and abiding the decision down there. Certainly there would be the right of an appeal. (Tr.
44)
* * *
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MR. INGEBRETSEN: I didn't 'vant to be plaeed
in a position of not going through the trial and
hearing and having an adjudication down there
and having the court award the custody to the
In otherTHE COURT: ·Once an order is made down there
MR. INGEBRET'SEN: I wanted that understanding.
MR. GUSTIN: That would be the final order.
Any final order.
THE COURT: Yes, that's a final order. Of
course, there's a right to an appeal down there.
MR. INGEBRETSEN: Yes.
THE CO·URT : Yes. And technically there's a
righ.t to an appeal here, but I don't imagine you'd
get very far if you try to appeal here, because I'll
retain the temporary custody of the children."
(Tr. 45)
A further hearing was had in the instant cause on
October 14, 19·54 (Tr. 57-85), at which time it was shown
that the California court made its findings of fact, conclusions of law and order (Ex. 4), all to the effect that
defendant's application for modification was denied and
he was ordered to immediately deliver the children to
the plaintiff at her hon1e in ·san Francisco. The defendant, by Exhibit 1 and by Exhibits 2 and 3, showed that he
had appealed to the 'Supreme Court of the State of California from the trial court's order. .After evidence of the
California p-roceedings and the statements of counsel
the court entered the order appealed from.
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Preliminary to evidence of the status of the California proceedings, defendant by his counsel called attention to the stipulations entered into in the June proceedings (Tr. 58) and stated in effect that an appeal having subsequently been taken to the Supreme Court of
California the question is whether such an appeal comes
within the purview of the stipulation in the sense that,
pending that appeal, this matter remain in status quo
and the children remain within the jurisdiction of the
district court in and for Salt Lake County (Tr. 59).
To avoid any distortion of the so-called stipulation
we invite attention to all of the expressions of the trial
court and counsel at both the June and October hearings.
'Ve believe, however, that our theory of the premise upon
'vhich the order in the instant case was entered is pointed
out by the following:
"MR.. GUSTIN: Now I'm wondering if there is any
dispute, Mr. Ingebretsen, any question in your
mi.nd or the mind of your client but what it would
not be detrimental to these children so far as their
environment is concerned~ I'm speaking of the
family and the people that they're living with, to
have them remain here during the pendency of the
appeal in California.
I'm ready to put on evidence as to that if counsel
requires it. (Tr. 67)
* * *
MR. GUSTIN: I think school opened the first
part of September. Now, the children are adjusted
to this situation. They've been here for practically
a year and a half. The environment is wholesoine.
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I don't think counsel will question that.
THE COURT: Well, all I'm trying to do is to
respect and recogniz·e your theory of the case
and let you get in the record what you want in,
and, if we can, avoid taking testimony. Are you
prepared to stipulate the boy is in the first grade
in school~
MR. INGEBR.E·TSEN: I'll stipulate that.
THE COURT·: And the children, considering
their ages, and so on, are adjusted where they're
staying. They know where the gate is and the
sidewalk, and I guess they know some neighbor
kids. That would follow as a matter of course
with most children.
MR. IN,GEBR.ETSEN: I think so.
THE CO·URT: Tha;t saves putting on testimony
in that regard. Is there anything else you would
offe-r to provef
MR. GUST'IN: I would ask counsel if he would
agree with me that th·e children are in a wholesome, compatible environment at the· moment, with
Lieutenant Jenkins and his wife and Lieutenant
Jenkin's mother.
MR. INGEBRETSEN: I have no evidence to the
contrary of that. (Tr. 73-74)

* * *

MR. GUSTIN: * * * Now, the only thing I'n1
contending for is the California rule: 'A perfected app·eal in an action for the custody of a
child automatically constitutes a stay of proceedings and p-recludes a trial court from interfering
with custody a.s existed at the time of the appeal.'
And I'm trying to fit this proceeding into that
situation.
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THE COUR.T: All right. No\v have \Ve taken care
of the record~
~IR.

GUSTIN: So far as I'rn concerned.

THE COURT: All right. Well, in order to
shorten it up, let me ask you this question: Why
shouldn't the court grant the writ forthwith on the·
condition that the children rernain here with their
mother a number of days in order to take care of
sornething that I'rn reluctant to foreclose, even
though I've said other\vise, and that's an appeal
to the Supreme Court of Utah, and a stay by
somebody up there~ ( Tr. 75)
* * *
l\1R. GUSTIN: I think your Honor has the power
to stay this matter at this stage of the proceedings. I personally would find it quite embarrassing to go to the ·suprerne Court of the State of
Utah in view of the stipulation that I made with
your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, I don't want to foreclose
you from that opportunity, * * *.
* * * I'rn willing to go back slightly on what I've
indicated in order to give you the chance to go up
to the Capitol and ask for that stay." (Tr. 76-77)
By Exhibit 4 it will appear that the California trial
court on September 22, 1954, rnade a finding that it is for
the best interests of the minor children that they be in
the care, custody and control of their natural mother,
the plaintiff. But there is no such finding of the trial
court in the instant case. rr.,he findings, conclusions and
order appealed fron1 are silent as to what is for the best
interests of the minor children in the premises.
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S·TATEl\IENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT EXERCISING ITS
PLENARY POWER TO MAINTAIN THE ACTION IN STATUS QUO AT LEAST UN'TIL THE CALIFORNIA APPEAL
HAS BEEN DETERMINED.

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS WITHOUT INQUIRING INTO WHAT IS
FOR THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE MINOR CHILDREN
IRRESPECTIVE OF THE CALIFORNIA PROCEEDINGS.

POINT III.
THERE BEING NO FINDING AS TO WHAT IS FOR
THE BEST IN'TERESTS OF THE MINOR CHILDREN, THE
ORDER GRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS ·CORPUS IS
CONTRARY TO LAW.

AR,GUMENT
The foregoing points can be properly argued upon
the n1ain prernise tha.t the best interest and welfare of
the children is the con trolling factor and is the rule
adopted by this Court in child custody cases when not
controlled by statute. The rule applies in both habeas
corpus proceedings in the district court and proceedings
in the juvenile court. Briggs z:. Briggs, 111 Utah 418, 181
P. 2d 223. Has the rule been applied and followed in
the instant case?
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1. If the California proceedings are at all significant the court acted prematttt.rely in gra.nting the writ of
habeas corpus .
. A._t the outset of the hearing in June the court in-

vited discussion as to why the parties \vere not litigating
the question of custody in the California court (Tr. 21).
The rnatters that followed resulted in the hearing being
continued without date pending the filing by the defendant of a petition to modify in the Superior Court of San
Diego County, California, the court retaining the temporary custody of the children pending an order from that
court. The order of the California court, adverse to the
defendant, \Yas prornptly appealed and the appeal was
pending at the time of the October hearing herein. Certainly it \vould have been to the best interests and welfare
of the children under the circurns tances, as shown by the
record in this case, to await the outcome of the California
appeal if the California proceedings were to have any
effect, persuasively or other\vise, upon the decision of the
court. The children are in a wholesorne, cornpatible environrnent with the defendant and his \Yife .. \Vhy shuttle
the children back and forth between the States of Utah
and California, which would be the case theoretically at
least, if the decision being appealed frorn in the latter
State is reversed.
In the case of Ex parte Barr, 243 P. 2d 787, the Suprerne Court of California quotes the California rule as
follows:
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" ' (A) perfected appeal in an action for the
custody of a child automatically constitutes a stay
of proceedings and precludes a trial court from
interfering with custody as it existed at the tin1e
of appeal.' "
The Court then goes on to state:
"Otherwise, litigants would be encouraged
to seize possession of the child pending appeal
in the hope that in subsequent habeas corpus proceedings they could persuade an appellate court
that their action was in the best interests of the
child and that it should ratify their conduct by
refusing to issue the writ. As colorfully pointed
out in In re Browning, supra, 108 Cal. App. 503,
507, 291 P. 650, 651, the child would be 'in the category of a human football whose possession by
either parent depends upon the agility, activity,
and determination of each.' "
It is to beg the question to sa.y that the trial court,
by its conditional order, permitted this Court or one of
the Justices thereof to issue a stay and thus preserve the
status quo. The district courts of this state are courts
having plenary power beyond that, except in matters of
original jurisdiction, of the Supreme Court itself. It 'vas
the duty of the district court to resolve the issue and if
it was going to be controlled by the proceedings in the
California court then its duty was to "\vithhold its judgment until the proceedings in that court became final.
When the court acted in the instant case there "\Yas no
"final" judgment of the California court upon the petition for modification initiated pursuant to the stipulation
by the defendant.
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0

The best interest issue should hnve been deter}JZ.inecl irrespective of the California proceedin.qs.

The father vvas given the custody of the children
hy the 1nother on l\iay 5, 1953, "'in accordance \vith the
tern1s of said interlocutory decree an:cl by reason of the
illness of the plaintiff at the ti1ne" ( Con1plaint Tr. 2).
The plaintiff pleads the fact of her illness by her complaint herein. She alleges that she has recovered from
such illness but who is to deter1nine that fact with the
children rightfully in the custody of the father and within
the jurisdiction of this court~ If the illness of the mother
\Vas reason enough for her to turn the children over to the
father it must certainly follow that there \vas a recognition on her part of being unable to properly care for and
attend them. Who is to be the final arbiter of when the
condition ceased which prompted the giving of custody
of the children to the father and where is the authority
to determine 1natters of custody of 1ninor children found
'vi thin the borders of this State? Obviously the answer
is the district court of our State and in some instances
the juvenile court. The plaintiff by her petition or complaint for the writ of habeas corpus initiated proceedings
in our district court, a court of general jurisdiction, and
once that \Vas done the court could not delegate its authority to a foreign jurisdiction.
In the Briggs case, supra, a prior decree of the State
of Texas was involved. The decree a\varded the custody
of the child to the 1nother and, \Vhile this court affirmed

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
the judg1nent of the District Court of lTtah County
awarding the child to the n1other on habeas corpus proceedings, it, nevertheless, concluded, independently of the
Texas decree, that in vie\v of all of the facts and circuinstances presented it \Yas not convinced that the best interests of the child required that the 1nother be deprived of
such custody.
In Sa.m.psell v. Holt, 115 Utah 73, 202 P. 2d 550, a
Nevada decree \Vas n1odified by the court below. It was
held that the trial court erred in phrasing its decree in
such fashion as to a1nend, or purporting to amend, the
Nevada decree, but held the error to be forma1 only and
then proceeded to correct the same without reversing the
result or requiring a ne'v trial. As to the contention that
full faith and credit was required to be given to the Nevada decree this Court said:
"By the 'veight of authority it is now well
established 'that in th·e absence of fraud, or \Vant
of jurisdiction, affecting its validity, a decree of
divorce awarding the custody of a child of the
marriage 1nust be given full force and effect in
other states as to the right to the custody of the
child at the time and under the circumstances of
its rendition; but that such a decree has no controlling effect in another state as to facts and condition arising subsequently to the date of the decree; and the courts of the latter state may, in
proper proceedings award the custody otherwise
upon proof of matters subsequent to the decree
\vhich justify the change in the interest of the
child.' (Italics added) 20 A.L.R. 815. The rule
thus stated has been followed in this state. Cooke
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v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 2-!8 P. 83; 72 ~~.L.R-. 444
note. Later cases on this sa1ne point are collected
in Goldsmith v. ·salkey, 131 Tex. 139, 112 S.W. 2d
165, 116 A.L.R. 1209 and ~Icl\1illin v. Mc~~Iillin, 114
Colo. 2-1-7, 158 P. 2d 4-t-4, 160 A.L.R. 400."
The plaintiff herself pleads a substantial change of
circu1nstances following the entry of the California interlocutory decree. She pleads that she recognized her
illness as being sufficient cause for her to voluntarily
surrender custody of the children to the defendant. The
effect of such change of condition as affecting the best
interests of the children 1nust be decided by the courts
of this State so long as the children rernain in this State
and the jurisdiction of such court is invoked. Neither the
parties nor the trial court can solve the proble1n by any
half way 1neasure. It would invite the utn1ost confusion
and conflict of la\vs to have the court of one sovereign
~tate retaining the physical custody of the ·children and
agreeing in advance to abide the outco1ne of a proceeding
in another jurisdiction, particularly vvhen the other
jurisdiction does no:t have the rhildren before it.

3. The order grarnting custody to l;lain.tiff is not
sup ported' by the fi.ndings.
The court made no finding in connection \vith its
order of ·October 1-1-, 1954, the order appealed from, as
to the best interests of the children in the pre1nises. In
the Briggs case, supra, it is stated:
"Under that construction the n1other \vould be
an in1proper person to have the enstody of this
child if the welfare and best interest of the child
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required that it be reared by its father, and the
determining factor would be what, under the surrounding facts and circumstances, would be for
the best interest and welfare of the child. That is
the rule which we have adopted in child custody
cases not covered by this statute. This is true
both in habeas corpus proceedings in the district
court and proceedings in the juvenile court. Walton v. Coffman, Utah, 169 P. 2d 97; Baldwin v.
Nielson, Utah, 170 P. 2d 179, on rehearing 174 P.
2d 437; In re Bradley, Utah, 167 P. 2d 978; In re
Olson, Utah, 180 P. 2d 210. In the recent case of
Anderson v. Anderson, Utah, 172 P. 2d 132, although \Ve did not directly refer to or discuss this
statute, or the meaning of this term, "\Ve applied
this rule and took a child from the mother and
gave it to its father because we were convinced
that the best interest and welfare of the child requires such a change. The facts in that case
brought it within the provisions of this section
but vve took this one child fron1 her notwithstanding the fact that "\Ye approved a finding that she
was a fit person to have the custody of her children and allowed her to retain the custody of
other children of the parties."
In Snzith v. Snz ith, 1 lTtah 2d 75, 262 P. 2d 283, this
Court said:
''The deter1nining issue here is \vhat will be
for th.e· best interest of the child. This is an ultimate question of fact \vhich the trial court found
in the mother's favor. Child custody cases are
equitable in nature and so we must review both
the la\v and the facts. Here we have a double
problen1 of determining not only the occurrences
and events here involved but the much n1ore un-
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certain and controversial pro ble1n of trying to
look into the future and see the effect on the happiness and well-being of the child each course
\Vill bring, and thus detern1ine which course will
be for the best interest of the child."
CONCLUSION

Defendant did not invite this appeal. He asked the
trial court to pern1it hi1n to keep the children, who have
been vvith him since May 1953, until the 1natter is "finally" determined by the California court and suggested
that the trial court exercise that power (Tr. 76). If that
had been done then, upon the determination of the California appeal, the court n1ight well have taken the California proceedings into consideration in determining
\Vhat should be done with the children in light of their
welfare and best interests, but not having done so the
matter is only partially tried as indicated by the fact
that there is no finding as to what is for the best interests
of the children and their welfare. The custody of the children has been preserved in the father and the status
quo maintained, and thus it becomes of substance that
this Court reverse the order appealed from and remand
the proceedings to the lower court for a determination
as to what n1ust be done for the 'velfare and in the best
interests of the children.
Respectfully sub1nitted,
GUSTIN, RICHARD'S & MAT·TSSON
and FRED I-I. EVANS
Attorneys for Defendants a,nd
A ppella.nts
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